1. Philosophy of Hope: Ethical and Political Perspectives
My work on hope connects the debate on the nature and rationality of hope with questions about the role of hope in concrete contexts. I recently finished a book manuscript (“Habilitationsschrift”), where I explore a broadly Kantian perspective, which is characterized, first, by a priority of the normative question (“What may I hope?”), as opposed to the conceptual one and, second, by a focus on hopes that are central for a person’s outlook, in particular moral and political hopes. I investigate connections to the philosophy of emotions, to the temporality of the good life, to the debate on forgiveness and to the discourse about the climate crisis.
From 2015-2016, I pursued work on hope together with Titus Stahl (Groningen University) in the project “Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity” as part of the larger project “Hope and Optimism” at Notre Dame University and University of Pennsylvania.
Hope is a subject that is not only philosophically fascinating, but also attracts interdisciplinary interest. Currently, I’m involved in a project with sociologists from the University of Warsaw who investigate the connections between religiosity, hope and the commitment to democratic institutions (on the basis of empirical studies). Further, I’m part of an interdisciplinary research group “Hope in Times of Crisis. Psychoanalytic, socio-psychological and philosophical perspectives” (with Prof. Darrel Moellendorf, Prof. Vera King and others).
I’m part of the DFG-network “Religion and the Emotions”.
2. Responsibility and Imputation
Our moral and legal practice relies on the idea that we are responsible agents: Our actions are imputable to us, i.e. we are responsible for them in a retrospective sense that grounds praise- or blameworthiness. In my dissertation, I present a comprehensive study of Kant’s concept of imputation. I show that the concept of imputation links the concept of freedom, the notion of a person, and Kant’s deontological ethics. Besides offering interpretive work, I bring Kant’s thought into dialogue with contemporary debates, especially with discussions following Peter Strawson’s seminal article “Freedom and Resentment” (1962).
After having explored Strawson’s idea that our practice of ascribing responsibility has a defeasible structure (here), I want to take seriously his idea that our practice crucially rests on our being susceptible to “reactive attitudes”, such as resentment, indignation and gratitude. My aim is also to explore the consequences of this approach in the context of the artificial intelligence applications. I’m a member of the new DFG-network “AI and Responsibility”.
My work on forgiveness connects my interest in the reactive attitudes (especially the fittingness of resentment) with my aim to work out a Kantian perspective on forgiveness.